We analyze the welfare e¤ects of "parity" rules, prevalent in telecommunications and other regulated industries, that force a vertically-integrated input monopolist to treat its own downstream a¢ liate and downstream competitors comparably in terms of input price and quality. When input pricing is unconstrained, our results show that input-quality parity requirements may lower social welfare. Either no private incentive exists to engage in input-quality discrimination, or the presence of rival input-quality "sabotage"(or possibly "self-sabotage") is both a pro…t-maximizing and welfare-maximizing outcome. With cost-based input-pricing parity requirements, the input monopolist has incentive to ine¢ ciently downgrade its downstream rival's input quality and possibly to excessively upgrade the input quality of its downstream a¢ liate. Thus, the desirability of inputquality parity requirements is highly dependent on the nature of the input-pricing policy. We also …nd that input-quality parity not only creates an incentive for the input monopolist to set a higher input price to its downstream rivals, but to set price above marginal cost to its downstream a¢ liate as well.
Introduction
A predicament arises in certain industries where strong scale and scope economies imply that the monopoly provision of an essential input is an e¢ cient market structure. If, in addition, the input monopolist integrates into downstream production, the opportunity arises for it to favor its a¢ liate over rival …rms. Regulators have adopted structural or nonstructural policies to prevent anticompetitive behavior under these circumstances in industries such as telecommunications and electric power, but these restrictions may sacri…ce some e¢ ciency in the process.
Vertical separation of upstream and downstream activities is one drastic measure that prevents the upstream …rm from attempting to leverage its market power into an advantageous competitive position in downstream markets. The divestiture of AT&T embraced this approach when its local and long-distance networks were separated. A cost of this structural separation is the forgone vertical e¢ ciencies that arise under the common ownership of upstream and downstream activities.
A frequent regulatory compromise is to impose "nonstructural separation" between the two stages of production, where the upstream and downstream activities are placed in separate a¢ liates within the same commonly-owned …rm. Accompanying this type of separation, the upstream monopolist is typically faced with so-called "parity"or "nondiscrimination"rules, which require it to treat its downstream a¢ liate and downstream rivals alike. For example, parity rules are often imposed on the pricing or quality of inputs (e.g., access to facilities) o¤ered by regulated utilities such as local telephony providers and electric transmission and distribution companies. This paper examines the welfare consequences of such rules when input prices and qualities a¤ect downstream competition between a¢ liated and rival …rms.
Several recent court cases have examined the issue of input-quality discrimination, principally in relation to the implementation of the 1996 Telecom Act. In its Trinko decision, 1 the Supreme Court addressed once again the question as to whether a monopolist was immune from antitrust liability given that it was regulated. In that case, the input monopolist-an incumbent local telephone company-had allegedly engaged in discriminatory treatment in providing access to its network (despite quality parity requirements required by the Telecom Act). Concern over such discrimination is at the heart of the current debate raging over "Net Neutrality" in the United States and Europe. Policymakers, business executives, and economists have expressed concerns that broadband network owners could give more favorable price and quality terms to Internet content, application, and service providers with whom they have contractual arrangements or other types of vertical relationships. As a result, they argue, Internet end users will be harmed by limited access to content and services.
Responding to the types of policy issues identi…ed above, a growing economic literature has grappled with the theoretical issues surrounding the question of whether a vertically-integrated input monopolist has a pro…t incentive to engage in so-called "sabotage" (i.e., adverse nonprice discrimination) against downstream rivals.
2 Weisman (1995) , Economides (1998) , Rei¤en (1998) , Beard, Kaserman, and Mayo (2001) , and others have characterized "sabotage"as an additional cost imposed on una¢ liated downstream rivals arising from their use of inputs supplied by the integrated input monopolist. Accordingly, these models are akin to the literature on raising rivals'costs, since they e¤ectively impose an "excise tax"on una¢ liated downstream …rms. Departing somewhat from this literature, Mandy and Sappington (2004) allow a verticallyintegrated input monopolist to sabotage its downstream rival by taking an action that directly reduces demand for that rival's product. They …nd that the pro…tability of sabotage depends on the intensity of retail competition.
3 Sand (2004) investigates how nonprice discrimination a¤ects the optimal regulation of access charges paid by downstream vendors. Using a "raising rivals'cost" model, he …nds that a higher optimal access charge lessens the incentive for the integrated input monopolist to engage in nonprice discrimination. He concludes that the ability to engage in nonprice discrimination harms social welfare. Contrasting with the prior literature, our paper examines input-quality discrimination that directly alters the attributes of competitors'…nal products as sold to retail customers. Here, "sabotage" represents a downgrading of downstream product quality achieved through a downgrading of input quality supplied to the downstream …rm. Further distinct from prior literature that frequently treats "sabotage" as a costless exercise for the perpetrator, we assume that input-quality degradation may lower or raise the input monopolist's supply costs, as there could be additional expense involved in creating a separate "damaged"version of the input. This modeling framework allows us to directly assess an integrated supplier's incentives to engage in input-quality discrimination that reduces the utility derived from consuming downstream rivals'products, along with the corresponding social welfare e¤ects.
In our model, an input monopolist, seeking to maximize the combined pro…ts earned by itself and its downstream a¢ liate, can potentially discriminate between its downstream a¢ liate and a downstream rival in setting its input prices and qualities subject to regulatory constraints. We …nd that when the input monopolist has su¢ cient freedom in setting its input prices, it either has no incentive to engage in input-quality discrimination, or such discrimination is socially bene…cial because it more accurately matches the marginal bene…ts of increased quality with the associated marginal costs. When the downgrading of rival input quality (i.e., "rival sabotage") does occur, the consumer value of additional quality provided to the downstream rival is still less than its stand-alone costs. Under these circumstances, quality parity provisions imposed on the input monopolist potentially reduce social welfare. It is also possible that the upstream monopolist will have incentive to provide downgraded input quality to its own downstream a¢ liate, and that this "self-sabotage"will represent e¢ cient behavior from a social-welfare standpoint.
We also examine the case when regulation requires that input prices are nondiscriminatory and set at marginal cost. Under these circumstances, the incentive to engage in socially wasteful input-quality sabotage emerges for two reasons. First, we presume that quality downgrading is di¢ cult to observe, and the input price will therefore be based on the costs of providing the higherquality input. This type of cost-based price regulation e¤ectively places a "price cap"on the input monopolist when determining input quality for the downstream rival, giving the monopolist an incentive to reduce input supply costs by downgrading the downstream rival's input quality (under conditions where quality downgrading is cost-saving for the upstream supplier). A similar incentive also would exist if the nondiscriminatory input price is based instead on the average (variable) costs facing the upstream monopolist in supplying both downstream …rms.
Second, downgrading of the downstream rival's input quality may shift demand to the downstream a¢ liate, increasing pro…ts earned from a¢ liate sales. Due to this second e¤ect, the incentive to engage in rival quality sabotage may exist under cost-based input pricing even if "sabotaging" rival input quality actually increases the upstream monopolist's supply costs.
Conversely, the same regulatory scheme may cause socially excessive input quality to be provided to the downstream a¢ liate, since boosting the a¢ liate's input quality allows the input monopolist to charge higher prices to the downstream rival. This suggests that the implementation of inputpricing parity in the form of cost-based input pricing creates perverse incentives, encouraging the input monopolist to engage in input-quality discrimination and to disadvantage downstream rivals by overinvesting in the input quality provided to its own downstream a¢ liate.
As for input pricing, we …nd that the input monopolist has an incentive to set a higher input price to the downstream rival than its downstream a¢ liate, but it will typically set an input price above marginal cost to its own downstream a¢ liate. By setting its a¢ liate's input price above marginal cost, the input monopolist earns additional pro…ts as a result of higher associated input sales to the downstream rival, while neither the input monopolist nor its downstream a¢ liate initially sacri…ces pro…ts as a result of the associated downstream price e¤ects. Thus, the integrated …rm increases its pro…ts even though it engages in "double marginalization."
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, while Section 3 provides a de…nition of the concept of quality "sabotage." Section 4 addresses optimal input-quality choices and the incentives for input-quality sabotage when the input monopolist can freely discriminate between downstream …rms in its input price and quality o¤erings. Some of our results are based on the use of a random-utility demand model, which is also presented in this section. Section 5 discusses the incentives for input-price discrimination under an input-quality parity requirement, while Section 6 discusses the incentives for input-quality discrimination and quality sabotage under a cost-based, input-pricing parity requirement. Section 7 o¤ers concluding remarks.
The Model
A vertically integrated input monopolist (VIM) is the sole supplier of an essential input (e.g., network "access") to its downstream a¢ liate and a downstream competitor, which we refer to as "retailers" for expositional convenience. Absent regulation, the monopolist freely sets the price and quality of the input to each retailer. The rival retailers compete by simultaneously setting prices for their di¤erentiated …nal products, taking the o¤ered input price and quality as given. Despite the fact that it is owned by the input monopolist, the a¢ liated retailer seeks to maximize only its own retail pro…ts, consistent with rules regarding "nonstructural separation" that apply to telecommunications, electricity, and other regulated industries where unregulated a¢ liates are constrained to behave independently of their regulated entities.
In our model, quality is given a general interpretation. It may be an intrinsic property of the input itself, such as its durability, or some technical feature relating to its performance characteristics.
The timing of actions in our model unfolds as follows. First, the regulatory authority chooses whether to impose a parity rule on the input monopolist with respect to either input pricing or quality. Second, the input monopolist simultaneously sets the input price and quality for each downstream retailer to maximize the total pro…ts of the integrated …rm, subject to any constraints imposed by parity requirements. The input qualities chosen by the input monopolist directly determine the retail product qualities. Third, based on the o¤ered input prices and qualities, both retailers set product prices that conform with a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Finally, the retail market clears as end users purchase from one of the two retailers based on their price and quality attributes.
Downstream Competition
The two retailers produce di¤erentiated products and compete on price, subject to retail product quality that is determined by the provided input quality and input prices chosen by the input monopolist (subject to any imposed regulatory constraints). Designating the a¢ liated retailer as …rm 0 and the rival retailer as …rm 1, we can express the retail pro…t for …rm i 2 f0; 1g as follows:
where D i is the demand for …rm i's product that depends, in turn, on its retail price p i , its rival's price p j, and the qualities q i and q j of the inputs purchased by the two …rms (which determine the qualities of their …nal products).
Retailer costs derive from two sources: (i) the constant marginal downstream production cost, d i ; and (ii) the per-unit wholesale price of the upstream monopolist's input, w i . The di¤erence in production cost, d 1 d 0 , represents the inherent cost advantage or disadvantage of the a¢ liated retailer. Any di¤erence in input prices, w 1 w 0 , is attributable to price di¤erentiation by the upstream monopolist. The input supplied by the upstream monopolist is consumed in a …xed proportion to output, which accounts for the additive nature of the supply costs facing each retailer.
As expressed below, we assume that the demand for a given retailer's product is decreasing with respect to its own price and increasing in its rival's price, and that a retailer's demand is increasing in its own product quality and decreasing in its rival's product quality:
For stability purposes, we assume that "own-price"e¤ects are stronger in absolute terms than "crossprice e¤ects," and that "own-quality" e¤ects are greater in absolute terms than "cross-quality" e¤ects. The …rst-order condition for the pro…t-maximizing retail price p i is as follows:
To satisfy second-order conditions for pro…t-maximization, induce upward-sloping reaction functions (consistent with prices as strategic complements), and ensure the stability and uniqueness of the downstream equilibrium, we assume that the following conditions hold for each …rm i:
2 ri dp i dp j > 0;
2 ri dp i dp j :
A unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium exists when each retailer is issuing its best-response price, (p 0 ; p 1 ) as described by equation (2.2). Under our assumptions, these equilibrium prices depend uniquely on the input prices and qualities (i.e., w 0 ; w 1 ; q 0 ; q 1 ) chosen by the vertically integrated input monopolist. However, it will be convenient to express the input monopolist's pro…t-maximization problem as a choice of input qualities and retail prices. Although retail prices must be consistent with a downstream Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the input monopolist e¤ectively controls this equilibrium (in the absence of regulatory constraints) through its choice of input prices and qualities. Rearranging equation (2.2), we obtain a closed-form expression for the relationship between input prices and retail prices:
Holding quality levels …xed, equation (2.3) can be solved for each …rm to obtain a unique pair of input prices associated with each Nash-equilibrium retail price combination. Similarly, holding Nash-equilibrium retail prices …xed, a unique pair of input prices is associated with each quality combination. Absent regulatory constraints, we therefore can consider retail prices and qualities as the instruments under the input monopolist's control, where the implied input prices,
jointly satisfy equation (2.3) in order to maintain consistency with a downstream Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. By totally di¤erentiating the retailers'…rst-order conditions (and substituting for p i d i w i from equation (2.2)), the following relationships are obtained between the retail prices and qualities observed in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and the underlying input prices needed to support that equilibrium:
Note that the signs of the above derivatives rely on assumptions (A1)-(A4). 
Upstream Pro…ts
Upstream pro…ts (i.e., m ) equal the input sales to each retailer multiplied by the price-cost margin earned on those sales (less …xed costs f ):
where w 0 = w 0 (p 0 ; p 1 ; q 0 ; q 1 ) and w 1 = w 1 (p 0 ; p 1 ; q 0 ; q 1 ) each satisfy equation (2.3), and c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ) and c 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ) represent the input monopolist's constant marginal cost of supplying retailers 0 and 1, respectively. As described more fully below, the marginal cost of supplying each retailer depends potentially on the input quality supplied to both retailers.
Quality-Related Input Supply Costs
A simple, yet fairly general, form for specifying the input monopolist's production costs is as follows:
where c i (q i ; q j ) is the constant marginal cost of producing input i, x i is the quantity produced of input i, and f is the …xed cost involved in setting up a speci…ed production facility or technology platform
1 < 0 based on second-order conditions (assumption (A3)), and d 2 r1 =dp 1 dw 1 = D 1 p1 > 0 based on downward-sloping demand (assumption (A1)). Similarly, dw 1 =dp 0 = (d 2 r1 =dp 1 dp 0 )=(d 2 r1 =dp 1 dw 1 ) < 0, based on assumptions (A1) and (A3).
(e.g., a communications network of speci…ed performance characteristics, where "access" is the relevant input). It is reasonable to assume that provision of two quality-di¤erentiated but otherwise similar products may involve "economies of scope,"such as the avoidance of additional …xed costs that arise if these inputs were alternately provided from two di¤erent technology platforms or production facilities.
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However, as a result of using a higher-quality technology to also provide a lower-quality input, it is possible that variable production costs for the lower-quality input may be higher than if a stand-alone technology was used solely to produce the lower-quality input. Thus, there may be some diseconomies from a variable cost standpoint. Given that q i q j , we assume that the "qualitybased"marginal cost function behaves as follows:
where 0 (q); 00 (q) > 0 and 1: The function (q) represents the "stand-alone"marginal cost of providing quality level q, where this cost increases in input quality at an increasing rate.
In the above speci…cation, the parameter captures the extent to which the marginal costs of supplying a given retailer are reduced or increased by downgrading that retailer's input quality below that of the other retailer. Assuming hypothetically that q 0 > q 1 , which implies that the rival retailer is o¤ered lower input quality than the a¢ liated retailer, three possibilities stand out in particular:
(i) = 1. In this case, the cost of supplying an input of speci…ed quality to the rival retailer is independent of the quality supplied to the a¢ liated retailer (i.e., c 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ) = (q 1 )). This represents a situation where downgrading rival input quality results in the maximum possible cost savings for the input supplier.
(ii) 0 < < 1. In this case, some costs are saved in downgrading the input quality supplied to the rival retailer, but these costs are less than the stand-alone di¤erence in input costs (since c 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ) = (1 ) (q 0 ) + (q 1 ) > (q 1 )). Marginal costs are in ‡uenced by the highest quality o¤ered on the technology platform, even if downgraded input quality is also o¤ered.
(iii) 0. In this case, downgrading input quality is costly (or provides no cost savings if = 0). Marginal costs would be lower if no quality downgrading occurs, representing a situation that might arise when an additional cost is incurred in "damaging"input quality.
If, by contrast, the rival retailer's quality level is higher than that provided to the a¢ liated retailer (i.e., q 1 > q 0 ), the associated marginal cost functions are "reversed"(i.e., c 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ) = (q 1 ) and c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ) = (1 ) (q 1 ) + (q 0 ), respectively). Our cost assumptions are likely to apply to the provision of telecommunications and electric transmission and distribution services, where a network is designed to achieve certain performance benchmarks. In these industries, it is typically uneconomic for a single …rm to build a separate overlapping network in order to o¤er a lower-performing alternative. In these situations, it is also possible that "damaging" the input sold to a rival (e.g., network access) involves an added cost above that which would occur if the input remained "undamaged."
Total Firm Pro…ts and the Input Monopolist' s Maximization Problem
When the vertically integrated input monopolist (VIM) faces no regulatory restrictions on its behavior, we have shown that it e¤ectively controls both retail prices p 0 and p 1 and qualities q 0 and q 1 through its choice of input prices and qualities, subject to the constraint that retail prices must be consistent with a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Given that the VIM seeks to maximize total …rm pro…ts (i.e., V IM ), which equal the sum of upstream pro…ts m (i.e., equation (2.9)) and the downstream a¢ liate's pro…ts r0 (i.e., equation (2.1)), we can express the VIM's pro…t-maximization problem as follows in the absence of regulation:
In the above equation, c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ) and c 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ) conform with equations (2.11) and (2.12), and the input prices w 0 and w 1 are consistent with the …rst-order conditions for a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the downstream market under the retail prices p 0 and p 1 and qualities q 0 and q 1 (as described by equation (2.3)). As represented in the last equality of equation (2.13), the downstream a¢ liate's input price w 0 is essentially an internal transfer price for the integrated …rm and does not a¤ect integrated pro…ts directly.
The Meaning of Sabotage
In contrast to much of the existing literature which treats "sabotage"as an additional product cost borne by the una¢ liated retailer, our model treats rival "sabotage" as a demand-shifting device where the upstream monopolist provides the rival retailer with lower input quality as a means of reducing that retailer's product quality in the estimation of consumers. Thus, we de…ne "rival sabotage"in its simplest formulation as follows :
By contrast, the imposition of input-quality parity requires that q 1 = q 0 .
An alternate formulation of sabotage may consider whether the rival retailer pays a higher quality-adjusted price for its input:
When input-pricing parity is imposed on the input monopolist (i.e., w 1 = w 0 ), this test for sabotage reduces to the simpler de…nition (i.e., q 1 < q 0 ). Furthermore, since supply cost varies with input quality (and this cost depends potentially on the quality of both inputs sold to retailers), one may wish to consider cost di¤erences as well. Taking a cue from the theory of price discrimination, one might consider that rival sabotage occurs when the input monopolist places a higher mark-up on the rival retailer's input than the a¢ liated retailer's input:
Based on this de…nition, rival sabotage arises under input-pricing parity when the marginal cost of supplying the rival retailer is lower than that of the a¢ liated retailer. This requires merely that the rival retailer's input quality is lower than the a¢ liated retailer's input quality, if input supply costs decline in response to quality downgrading (i.e., > 0 in equation (2.12)). An important distinction regarding sabotage has been made in the literature on raising rivals' costs. In that literature, at one extreme, the costs of the dominant …rm are una¤ected when it raises the costs of its rivals. It is possible, however, that the perpetrator's costs also rise as a result of engaging in sabotage. If < 0 in our model, then the input monopolist's costs are increased when it downgrades the input quality of the rival retailer (i.e., c 1 (q;) > c 1 (q; q) for all q > 0, as shown in equation (2.12)). Our model allows sabotage to be either cost-increasing or cost-reducing for the vertically integrated …rm depending on the value of :
We also consider incentives for the input monopolist to engage in "self sabotage,"where it o¤ers lower input quality to its a¢ liated retailer relative to the rival retailer. In this situation, q 0 < q 1 :
Incentives for Input-Quality Discrimination and Sabotage

Rival Input Quality with Unconstrained Input Pricing
Now, let's examine the conditions under which rival sabotage might occur when input pricing is unregulated. In this case, the VIM sets p 1 , q 1 , p 0 , and q 0 to maximize the total pro…ts from its combined upstream and downstream operations (where the input prices w 0 and w 1 are consistent with the downstream Bertrand-Nash equilibrium expressed by equation (2.3)). With respect to p 1 and q 1 , the …rst-order conditions from maximizing equation (2.13) are as follows:
where we have used equations (2.11) and (2.12) to represent marginal input supply costs and assumed temporarily that q 1 < q 0 . We make this assumption regarding input quality because our interest focuses on the welfare implications associated with rival quality sabotage, where rival sabotage is de…ned as o¤ering lower input quality to the downstream rival than the downstream a¢ liate. Substituting for @w 1 =@p 1 and @w 1 =@q 1 in the above equations, we obtain the following (using equations (2.6) and (2.8), respectively):
Comparing the above equations, the VIM's optimal input quality choice for the downstream rival depends among other factors on whether costs are saved or increased by downgrading rival input quality (i.e., whether is positive or negative)
Rival Input Quality with Random-Utility Demand
While the relationship between equations (4.3) and (4.4) appears somewhat di¢ cult to interpret, sharper results can be obtained by concentrating on a speci…c, yet ‡exible, speci…cation of consumer behavior, such as a discrete-choice random-utility model. In this setting, consumer h's indirect utility from purchasing retailer i's product (where i 2 f0; 1; ?g) is described as follows:
A given consumer's utility from consuming a particular product variety equals the sum of the deterministic indirect utility V i (p i ; q i ) and the additive idiosyncratic disturbance " hi , where " hi represents that consumer's realization of an i.i.d. draw from a continuously increasing cumulative distribution function F i and an associated probability density f i . Consumers also have the "no-purchase"option i = ?, where the utility associated with the no-purchase option also has a random disturbance term,
implying that a consumer's indirect utility decreases with respect to product price and increases with respect to product quality at a decreasing rate.
The "penetration rate" i of …rm i's product represents the fraction of the entire population choosing …rm i as their retail supplier:
For example, when all disturbances obey a type I extreme-value distribution, each retailer's penetration rate is described by the familiar logit expression:
using the normalization V ? = 0.
Under the above random-utility formulation, a customer consumes the quantity
where the marginal utility of income (i.e., @V i =@y) is constant under typical assumptions. Because the idiosyncratic disturbances enter additively, there are no di¤erences in consumption levels across customers of a speci…ed product. Additionally, we assume that each customer's consumption level is …xed for that product, implying that the demand for retailer i's product is essentially equal to the product penetration rate (after normalizing the quantity consumed and total consumer mass to one). In other words, D i (p 0 ; p 1 ; q 0 ; q 1 ) = i (p 0 ; p 1 ; q 0 ; q 1 ).
Di¤erentiating equation (4.6), we …nd that demand for a retailer's product is decreasing in its own price and increasing in its own product quality, while it is increasing in its rival's price and decreasing in its rival's quality:
Based on the above results, it can be shown that the following relationships hold:
By de…nition, i (q i ) represents the consumer value of a marginal increase in product i's quality per unit consumed (measured in terms of income). Referring to equation (4.12), this interpretation can be taken directly from the last equality, which is obtained by applying Roy's Identity (or by normalizing product demand to one unit per customer).
Rival Input-Quality Sabotage and Social Welfare with Random-Utility Demand Substituting equations (4.10) and (4.11) into equation (4.4), and then combining equations (4.3) and (4.4), we obtain the following result:
The …rst part of equation (4.11) is obtained by di¤erentiating equation (4.8), using our assumption that each customer consumes a …xed quantity of the good (which implies that @V i =@p i is constant and thus
8 We let b p 1 denote that the VIM has set p 1 to satisfy its …rst-order condition for maximizing total …rm pro…ts.
If = 1, then the marginal cost of providing an input of speci…ed quality to one downstream …rm is independent of the input quality provided to the other downstream …rm. Under these circumstances, the VIM o¤ers an input-quality level to the downstream rival that satis…es the condition, 1 (q 1 ) = 0 (q 1 ) (see equation (4.13)). Consequently, the consumer value of a marginal increase in input quality (per unit of output consumed) equals the marginal cost of providing the additional quality, which represents a social welfare-maximizing outcome. From this, we conclude:
Proposition 4.1. Assume that: (i) the marginal cost of providing an input of speci…ed quality to one retailer is independent of the other retailer's input quality (i.e., = 1); and, (ii) consumer preferences obey our random-utility model. In the absence of input price or quality regulation, the VIM selects socially optimal input quality for the rival retailer.
In e¤ect, the above proposition shows that Spence's (1975) result where a monopolist sets a socially optimal level of quality (when consumers have the same marginal value of quality 9 ) can hold even when that quality choice occurs upstream, the upstream monopolist o¤ers di¤erent qualities to di¤erent downstream …rms, and the upstream monopolist is vertically integrated into downstream production. If 0 < < 1, then some variable-cost diseconomies arise in o¤ering a lower-quality input on a higher-quality technical platform. Less cost is saved in o¤ering reduced rival input quality when compared to the case of "independent" marginal costs (where = 1 by contrast). Under these conditions, the VIM optimally o¤ers lower input quality to the rival retailer than its a¢ liated retailer (i.e., q 1 < q 0 ) only when the o¤ered input quality is at a level where the stand-alone cost of providing additional rival input quality exceeds the consumer value of additional input quality (i.e., 0 (q 1 ) > 1 (q 1 )). 10 We summarize below:
Proposition 4.2. Assume that: (i) variable cost diseconomies exist in providing a lower-quality input along with a higher-quality input (i.e., 0 < < 1); and, (ii) consumer preferences obey 9 Due to the separability of the utility function in our random-utility model, where idiosyncratic preferences are represented by an additive term, consumers have the same marginal value of quality with respect to a given retailer's product.
10 See equation (4.13). An "internal"solution (i.e., q 1 < q 0 ) exists only if 1 (q 1 ) = 0 (q 1 ). Given < 1, it follows that 1 (q 1 ) < 0 (q 1 ). If the right-hand side of equation (4.13) is positively valued when evaluated at q 0 = q 1 , it is not a pro…t-maximizing strategy to o¤er reduced input quality to the downstream rival. Instead, the downstream rival's input quality will equal or exceed that of the downstream a¢ liate.
our random-utility model. By de…nition, let "rival sabotage" occur when the VIM supplies lower input quality to its rival retailer than its a¢ liated retailer. In the absence of input price or quality regulation, if rival sabotage occurs in equilibrium, then the stand-alone incremental cost of providing additional input quality to the rival retailer exceeds its incremental consumer value. Thus, rival sabotage arises only when the VIM supplies greater input quality to the rival retailer than the social optimum based on stand-alone costs.
Lastly, let 0: This corresponds to a situation where rival input-quality sabotage actually increases the costs facing the VIM (or does not a¤ect its costs if = 0). In this case, 1 0 (q 1 ) > 0 for q 1 q 0 . Consequently, @ V IM =@q 1 > 0 for q 1 < q 0 , implying that the input monopolist has no incentive to provide the rival retailer with lower input quality than its a¢ liated retailer.
Corollary 4.3. Assume that: (i) rival quality sabotage is costly (i.e., 0); and, (ii) consumer preferences obey our random-utility model. Under these conditions, rival sabotage will not occur.
The above results show that, if the integrated input monopolist is unregulated, it has no incentive to ine¢ ciently downgrade the downstream rival's input quality. In this situation, an increase in the downstream rival's input (and retail) price accomplishes much of what can be gained through a decrease in the rival's input (and retail) quality: both instruments raise consumer demand for the downstream a¢ liate's product but they also lower the downstream rival's derived demand for the input. When consumers make a discrete choice as to their downstream supplier (which is common to telecommunications products and other product markets where sabotage is a potential issue), the proportional impact on consumer demand of a decrease in the downstream rival's quality relative to an increase in its price depends on their relative impacts on consumers' indirect utilities. In other words, the relative demand impact of a marginal decrease in the downstream rival's quality as compared to a marginal increase in its price is represented by the marginal value to consumers of increased quality (per unit of output consumed) expressed in terms of income.
Notwithstanding the associated demand e¤ects, a decline in the downstream rival's input quality has the added bene…t of lowering per-unit supply costs for the input monopolist (whenever 0 < 1). By contrast, an increase in the downstream rival's input price increases the input monopolist's revenue for each unit of the input sold to the downstream rival. Absent demand e¤ects, the direct pro…t bene…ts of lowering the downstream rival's input (and retail) quality relative to raising the downstream rival's input (and retail) price are thus proportional to the unit cost savings achieved by marginally reducing rival input quality. Given that the proportional demand e¤ects of these two instruments are determined by the decline in consumer value associated with a marginal reduction in the downstream rival's quality (expressed in terms of income), these instruments impart the same zero marginal impact on pro…ts under the socially optimal condition where the marginal value to consumers of increased rival quality equals its marginal cost.
Of course, with potential variable-cost diseconomies in producing two di¤erent input-quality levels from the same technology platform, the input quality o¤ered by the integrated input monopolist to the downstream rival is not independent of the input quality o¤ered to its downstream a¢ liate. If these diseconomies exist, the downstream rival bene…ts when the input monopolist o¤ers higher quality to its downstream a¢ liate. This reduces the cost of o¤ering increased quality to the downstream rival, leading to a higher quality level than is socially optimal based on stand-alone costs.
A¢ liate Input Quality with Unconstrained Input Pricing
We now examine the VIM's optimal input quality choice for its downstream a¢ liate when input pricing is unregulated. Using equation (2.13), we examine the input monopolist's …rst-order conditions with respect to p 0 and q 0 . Assuming that q 1 < q 0 , these conditions are as follows (where marginal input supply costs are described by equations (2.11) and (2.12)):
The …rst equation above makes use of the downstream a¢ liate's …rst-order condition, as represented by equation (2.2). Since w 0 is essentially an internal transfer price for the integrated company, a change in w 0 does not in ‡uence the integrated …rm's pro…ts by itself. However, to the extent that the downstream a¢ liate operates independently of its upstream entity, the increase in the downstream a¢ liate's price induced by an increase in its input price exacerbates a "double marginalization" e¤ect, as re ‡ected by the term (w 0 (q 0 ))D 0 p 0 in equation (4.14). Substituting for @w 1 =@p 0 and @w 1 =@q 0 from equations (2.6) and (2.8), respectively, we can express equations (4.14) and (4.15) alternately as follows:
A¢ liate Input Quality with Random-Utility Demand
In a discrete-choice, random-utility model with …xed consumption per consumer (i.e., D i (p 0 ; p 1 ; q 0 ; q 1 ) = i (p 0 ; p 1 ; q 0 ; q 1 ); and @V i =@p i is constant), it is evident from equations (4.10) and (4.11) that
. Substituting these results into equations (4.16) and (4.17), and then combining the two equations, we obtain the following:
where 0 (q 0 ) = (@V 0 =@q 0 )=(@V 0 =@p 0 ). The second equality above makes use of equation (2.2). If the marginal cost of providing an input of speci…ed quality to one downstream …rm is independent of the other downstream …rm's input quality (i.e., = 1), the input monopolist maximizes pro…ts by o¤ering socially optimal input quality to its downstream a¢ liate, which satis…es the condition, 0 (q 0 ) = 0 (q 0 ) (see equation (4.18)). From this, we conclude as follows:
Proposition 4.4. Assume that: (i) the marginal cost of providing an input of speci…ed quality to one retailer is independent of the other retailer's input quality (i.e., = 1); and, (ii) consumer preferences obey our random-utility model. In the absence of input price or quality regulation, the VIM also selects socially optimal input quality for the a¢ liated retailer. .18) is negatively valued. The …rst-order condition associated with an "internal solution" to this equation (where q 1 < q 0 ) is satis…ed only if 0 (q 0 ) > 0 (q 0 ); 11 which implies that the consumer value of additional a¢ liate input quality exceeds the stand-alone incremental cost of providing that additional input quality. We conclude as follows:
Proposition 4.5. Assume that: (i) variable cost diseconomies exist in providing a lower-quality input along with a higher-quality input (i.e., 0 < < 1); and, (ii) consumer preferences obey our random-utility model. By de…nition, let "rival sabotage"occur when the VIM supplies lower input quality to its rival retailer than its a¢ liated retailer. In the absence of input price or quality regulation, if the VIM supplies higher input quality to its a¢ liated retailer than its rival retailer in equilibrium, then the incremental consumer value of providing additional input quality to the a¢ liated retailer is greater than its stand-alone incremental cost. Thus, "rival sabotage"arises only when the VIM supplies less input quality to its a¢ liated retailer than the social optimum based on stand-alone costs.
If variable-cost diseconomies arise in o¤ering downgraded input quality using a common technology platform, the input monopolist increases the cost of o¤ering lower input quality to the downstream rival when it raises the input quality o¤ered to its own downstream a¢ liate. This is the case even when it is socially optimal to o¤er lower input quality to the downstream rival (possibly because consumers …nd the rival's product less desirable due to its lower intrinsic quality unrelated to input quality). As a result, the integrated input monopolist provides an input-quality level to its own downstream a¢ liate that is lower than the social optimum based on stand-alone costs. Under these circumstances, the downstream rival also bene…ts by receiving higher input quality than the socially optimal level based on stand-alone costs.
Of course, if rival input-quality sabotage is costly (i.e., 0), then rival sabotage does not occur. In the next section, we examine more fully the nature of the input monopolist's input-quality choice in the absence of quality discrimination.
Equilibrium Input Qualities with Random-Utility Demand and Unconstrained Input Pricing
Consider the case of symmetric product utility, where
nation. With our assumption that the consumption level per customer is …xed, the impact on 11 Of course, the …rst-order condition,
is satis…ed only if the VIM's pro…t-maximizing strategy is to o¤er higher input quality to the downstream a¢ liate than the downstream rival. If the right-hand side of equation (4.18) is negatively valued when evaluated at q 0 = q 1 , it is not a pro…t-maximizing strategy to o¤er higher input quality to the downstream a¢ liate. Instead, the downstream a¢ liate's input quality will be equal to or less than that of the downstream rival.
consumer indirect utility of a marginal increase in product quality is independent of that product's price. 12 Hence, with symmetric utility, the consumer value of a marginal quality increase is the same for both downstream …rms'products at any common quality level (i.e., @V 0 (q 0 )=@q 0 = @V 1 (q 0 )=@q 1 8q 0 ), regardless of product prices. Consequently, 0 (q 0 ) = 1 (q 0 ) = (q 0 ); assuming that the marginal utility of income is constant and consumption per customer is …xed (and identical across products). Maintaining our assumption that marginal production costs are (q 0 ) for the high-quality input and (1 ) (q 0 ) + (q 00 ) for the low-quality input (given that q 0 > q 00 ), the input monopolist maximizes integrated pro…ts under symmetric utility by supplying an identical input-quality level to both downstream …rms that is socially optimal. The pro…t-maximizing input-quality choice is b q, which satis…es (b q) = 0 (b q). 13 This choice occurs regardless of the value of (for 1). Now, consider asymmetric product utility where
At any speci…ed quality level, consumers derive greater utility from a marginal increase in the downstream a¢ liate's quality relative to a marginal increase in the downstream rival's quality. In terms of maximizing the integrated …rm's pro…ts, two possibilities exist for the optimal input-quality choices (based on an interior solution 14 ), depending on the value of .
One possibility is that b
Another possibility is that "rival sabotage"occurs where b
based on equations (4.13) and (4.18). Under this possible outcome, the input monopolist reduces its a¢ liated retailer's input-quality level so that variable-cost diseconomies are reduced when producing a lower-quality input for the rival retailer. For either possibility, the rival retailer receives higher input quality and the a¢ liated retailer receives lower input quality than the social optimum 12 Otherwise, a given customer's consumption level would be a¤ected by product quality. We assume that product quality determines which supplier is chosen (including a "no-purchase"option), but not the amount consumed of the product. 13 Given that the retail prices p 0 and p 1 are set optimally by the VIM, this input quality choice ensures that
q (refer to equations (4.13) and (4.18)). At the same time, given that rival input quality equals b q, and that marginal input supply costs are described by equations (2.11) and (2.12), the derivatives 14 Let's assume temporarily that the quality choices, q 0 and q 1 , are each drawn from the set q [q; q]. An interior solution represents an optimal equilibrium quality choice other than q or q. Such a solution necessarily exists if
15 This choice ensures that d V IM (b p 0 ; b p 1 ; q; q)=dq = 0 at q = b q (assuming that the upstream monopolist sets p 0 and p 1 optimally).
Also, for this choice to be optimal, it must hold that 1 (b q)
. Under these conditions, the partial derivative @ V IM (b p 0 ; b p 1 ; b q; q 1 )=@q 1 is positive for q 1 < b q and negative for q 1 > b q. Analogous conditions hold for @ V IM =@q 0 .
based on stand-alone costs (assuming < 1).
Compare the VIM's total pro…ts under the two di¤erent possibilities, noting that the VIM's cost savings from o¤ering lower input quality to one retailer are continuously increasing in . If = 0, no costs are saved from o¤ering di¤erent input quality levels, implying that q 1 = q 0 = b q (i.e., no rival sabotage occurs). By contrast, if = 1, so that the cost of supplying the input to one retailer is independent of the other retailer's input quality, then b q 1 < b q 0 is necessarily the VIM's optimal strategy (i.e., rival sabotage occurs). 16 Since the cost savings from pursuing a "sabotage"strategy relative to a "no sabotage" strategy increase continuously as increases, there must exist 0 > 0 such that rival sabotage occurs for > 0 and no sabotage occurs for < 0 .
If @V 0 (q 0 )=@q 0 < @V 1 (q 0 )=@q 1 , which implies that consumers derive greater utility from a marginal increase in the downstream rival's quality than a marginal increase in the downstream a¢ liate's quality, the opposite situation prevails. As increases to 1, a threshold is reached above which the VIM engages in "self sabotage."In this case, the input monopolist o¤ers lower input quality to its own downstream a¢ liate than to the downstream rival. We summarize this discussion below:
Lemma 4.6. Assume that consumer preferences obey our random-utility model.
where V is indirect utility. Then, there exists = 0 such that "rival sabotage"
0 , then there exists = 00 such that "self sabotage"occurs for > 00 .
Based on the above discussion, quality parity rules necessarily worsen welfare when there are no restrictions on input pricing. These provisions are unnecessary under certain conditions because no incentives exist to discriminate with respect to input quality. They lower welfare under other conditions because the input monopolist makes socially optimal input-quality choices, and those choices imply that one downstream …rm receives lower quality than the other. We summarize below:
Proposition 4.7. Assume that consumer preferences obey our random-utility model. In the absence of price or quality regulation, the VIM makes socially optimal input-quality choices. When they arise, "rival sabotage" or "self sabotage" are consistent with welfare-maximizing behavior. Consequently, when input pricing is unconstrained, quality parity provisions are welfare-reducing when they are binding on the VIM's input-quality choices.
The above results indicate that, under appropriate conditions, allowing unconstrained input pricing may eliminate incentives for an integrated supplier to engage in socially wasteful inputquality discrimination against a downstream rival. Either no quality discrimination occurs, and the common input-quality choice maximizes social welfare, or quality discrimination occurs but each input-quality choice maximizes social welfare.
Note that the diverse product o¤erings of downstream competitors and the diverse preferences of their customers may make it socially optimal for those …rms to prefer di¤erent input qualities. All else equal, the downstream …rm receiving lower input quality should, in fact, desire the lower quality level in this case.
Incentives for Distorting Input Prices under Input-Quality Parity
The Pro…t-Maximizing Rival Input Price under Input-Quality Parity
We next consider whether incentives exist for input-price discrimination when regulators impose input-quality parity requirements (i.e., q 0 = q 1 ). To permit a clearer assessment of incentives for price discrimination, we assume that there is symmetric downstream competition. Retailers face the same marginal production cost d, and demand is symmetric so that
where
Assuming that there is no quality discrimination (i.e., q 0 = q 1 and thus, (q 0 ) = (q 1 )), and that the retail a¢ liate's price p 0 satis…es the VIM's …rst-order condition (i.e., @ V IM (p 0 ; p 1 ; q 0 ; q 1 )=@p 0 = 0), we can subtract equation (4.14) from equation (4.1) to obtain:
The last equality is obtained by adding and subtracting the term,
, and then using equation (2.2). Now, assume hypothetically that no input-price discrimination occurs (i.e., w 0 = w 1 = w 0 ).
Since there is required input-quality parity and symmetric downstream competition, equilibrium prices and sales quantities must be the same for both downstream …rms (i.e., p 0 = p 1 = p 0 and
). Moreover, due to symmetric demand behavior, it follows that
). Making these substitutions into equation (5.1), the following equation is necessarily obtained (after some manipulation) if input prices are the same:
The last equality makes use of equation (2.2). Since D 0 p 1 > 0 and (@w 1 =@p 1 @w 1 =@p 0 ) > 0 (see equation (2.6) and assumption (A1)), the right side of equation (5.2) is necessarily positive in sign:
Assuming that second-order conditions hold, the VIM optimally sets input prices so that the downstream rival's retail price exceeds the downstream a¢ liate's retail price in equilibrium. 17 This is accomplished by raising the input price to the downstream rival above the level charged to the downstream a¢ liate (i.e., w 1 > w 0 ). We conclude as follows:
Proposition 5.1. With symmetric downstream competition and input-quality parity requirements, the VIM maximizes integrated pro…ts by setting a higher input price to its rival retailer than its a¢ liated retailer.
Note that the above result depends only on the general demand assumptions re ‡ected in conditions (A1) through (A4). From the integrated …rm's perspective, increasing the input price to its downstream a¢ liate only increases the transfer payment between the downstream and upstream parts of the …rm. Thus, there is no direct pro…t impact from increasing the downstream a¢ liate's input price, unlike the pro…t increase that results directly from increasing the downstream rival's input price (ignoring any demand e¤ects). For this reason, there is added incentive to raise the input price to the downstream rival relative to the downstream a¢ liate. 17 Technically, this requires that the following additional conditions hold, which are necessary for a unique interior solution:
i j for i; j 2 f0; 1g where j 6 = i.
In addition, the VIM earns only an upstream margin on additional sales made by the downstream rival, but it e¤ectively earns both an upstream margin and a downstream margin from additional sales made by its downstream a¢ liate. When input prices to both downstream …rms are the same (i.e., w 0 = w 1 ), the integrated …rm earns a higher overall margin from a one-unit increase in the downstream a¢ liate's sales when compared to a one-unit increase in the downstream rival's sales. The additional margin is equal to the downstream margin, (p 0 d 0 w 0 ). As a result of this extra margin, the VIM has incentive to increase the input price to the downstream rival in order to divert sales to its downstream a¢ liate.
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that incentives exist to engage in discriminatory input pricing even when the input quality o¤ered to both downstream …rms is identical and downstream demand is symmetric. The integrated input monopolist uses higher input pricing to the downstream rival to both increase its pro…t margin on input sales to the downstream rival and to shift downstream sales from the rival to its own a¢ liate. In the presence of symmetric downstream competition, this input-price discrimination is likely welfare-worsening.
The Pro…t-Maximizing A¢ liate Input Price under Input-Quality Parity
Of course, the question also arises as to what is the pro…t-maximizing input price to the downstream a¢ liate under input-quality parity requirements. One might think that this price should be set at marginal cost to avoid the problems associated with "double marginalization," but this is not typically the case.
Assuming input-quality parity (i.e., q 0 = q 1 ), and using the …rst-order condition for the optimal downstream retail price (see equation (4.14)), we obtain the following result after substituting for the expression w 1 (q 1 ) from equation (4.1):
These general results are a helpful starting point for analyzing the input monopolist's incentives under speci…c input-pricing parity policies, such as the cost-based input-pricing policy described below.
Input-Quality Choices under Cost-Based Input-Pricing Parity
An input-pricing parity regulation may be "cost-based," such that the input price to both downstream …rms equals the marginal cost of providing the input. In this case, we assume that w = c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ), which implies that the input price equals the marginal cost of supplying the input based on the input quality provided to the downstream a¢ liate. This assumption appears reasonable, given that we are speci…cally examining the possibility of sabotage, where the technology used to produce higher input quality may be "downgraded" to provide lower input quality to a downstream rival. We assume that quality downgrading may be di¢ cult to observe. Thus, the more readily observed costs of providing the higher-quality input are the basis for the regulated input price.
Rival Input Quality under Cost-Based Input-Pricing Parity
We now examine whether rival input quality is actually "sabotaged" under our cost-based inputpricing parity requirements. Substituting the equality, w = c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ), into equation (6.2), we obtain the following result (assuming that q 1 q 0 ; and thus c 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ) = (1 ) (q 0 ) + (q 1 ) and c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ) = (q 0 )):
Since the input price is determined by the marginal cost of supplying the input to the downstream a¢ liate (i.e., w = c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ) = (q 0 ) for q 1 q 0 ), the regulated input price is disassociated from the cost of supplying the downstream rival whenever the rival's input quality is less than the a¢ liate's input quality. Similar to the e¤ects of a price cap, there is a pro…t incentive for the VIM to reduce the cost of supplying the input to the downstream rival. When costs are saved by downgrading rival input quality (i.e., > 0), this can be achieved by lowering the quality o¤ered to the downstream rival (as represented by the term,
Based on equation (6.4), we obtain the following result as the downstream rival's input quality approaches (from below) that of the downstream a¢ liate (i.e., q 1 ! q 0 ), which implies that the cost of producing both inputs is virtually identical (i.e., c 1 (q 1 ! q 0 ; q 0 ) ! c 0 (q 0 ; q 0 ) = w):
If it is not costly to sabotage rival input quality (i.e., 0), the above equation is negative in sign whenever the downstream a¢ liate's sales decline in response to an increase in its downstream rival's quality and the associated equilibrium increase in its rival's price (i.e., D
Subject to this frequently satis…ed condition, and assuming that second-order conditions hold, it is indeed optimal for the VIM to set the downstream rival's input quality below that of its downstream a¢ liate (which conforms with our de…nition of "rival sabotage").
18
Proposition 6.1. Assume that there is a cost-based input-pricing parity requirement, as described above. The VIM "sabotages" the rival retailer's input quality if: (i) rival quality sabotage is not cost-increasing for the VIM (i.e., 0), and, (ii) an increase in the rival retailer's quality is associated with a decrease in sales by the a¢ liated retailer (inclusive of the sales impact resulting from the associated increase in the rival retailer's equilibrium price).
Since it can be shown that D
< 0 in our discrete-choice, random-utility model, it follows that: Corollary 6.2. Assume that there is a cost-based input-pricing parity requirement, and consumer preferences obey our random-utility model. The VIM "sabotages"the rival retailer's input quality whenever rival quality sabotage is not cost-increasing.
Note that, even if it is costly for the upstream a¢ liate to sabotage rival input quality (i.e., < 0), pro…ts of the integrated …rm still may increase through rival sabotage. This situation arises when the sabotage-induced increase in sales to the downstream a¢ liate, multiplied by the margin earned on those sales, is larger in magnitude than the associated cost of sabotage (i.e.,
In this case, the input quality provided to the downstream rival is likely below the socially optimal level. Input supply costs can be reduced, and 18 If q 1 > q 0 , then w = c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ) < c 1 (q 0 ; q 1 ). The VIM earns a negative margin on input sales to the downstream rival. When increases in the downstream rival's quality raise the quantity demanded of the downstream rival's product and lower the quantity demanded of the downstream a¢ liate's product, it is clearly unpro…table for the VIM to o¤er higher quality to its downstream rival than to its downstream a¢ liate. By doing so, the VIM induces a decline in the total pro…ts earned from both downstream a¢ liate and downstream rival sales.
consumer welfare frequently will increase, if the input monopolist raises the downstream rival's input quality to the level o¤ered to its own downstream a¢ liate.
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Similar incentives regarding sabotage would arise if we replace the current input-pricing scheme with one where the nondiscriminatory input price is based on the average (variable) supply cost incurred in providing the input to both downstream …rms. Under the "average supply cost"inputpricing arrangement, a reduction in rival input quality reduces the downstream rival's input price by less than the actual decline in the marginal cost of supplying the rival (since the cost of supplying the input to the downstream a¢ liate is una¤ected by rival quality downgrading). By itself, this e¤ect implies that the VIM's pro…ts are increased from downgrading rival input quality. Also, as we see below, there may be an incentive to provide excessive input quality to the downstream a¢ liate under cost-based input-pricing parity.
The above proposition contrasts with results from the prior sabotage literature. Treating "sabotage" as a strategy of raising rivals' supply costs that the integrated …rm can carry out without a¤ecting its own costs, Beard, Kaserman, and Mayo (2001) …nd that incentives exist to engage in sabotage when input prices are su¢ ciently low. Using a homogeneous-product model, Economides (1998) …nds more generally that sabotage incentives are strong enough to force …rms from the market when sabotage is again costless for the perpetrator to carry out.
By contrast, we …nd more generally that the incentive to engage in sabotage in the form of rival-quality downgrading depends on: (i) the nature of the input-pricing policy; (ii) upstream and downstream margins; (iii) downstream demand conditions; and, (iv) whether input-quality sabotage reduces or increases the input monopolist's costs (see equation 6.2)). When sabotaging rival input quality reduces the input monopolist's costs, there appears to be a strong incentive to engage in rival sabotage if there is cost-based input-pricing parity (or upstream margins are su¢ ciently small). It is possible that the incentives for sabotage are su¢ ciently strong to produce a "corner"solution where the downstream rival is o¤ered the lowest possible input quality. This outcome is more likely when it is costless or cost-reducing for the VIM to downgrade rival input quality, downstream margins are high relative to upstream margins, and quality sabotage increases the sales of the downstream a¢ liate.
A¢ liate Input Quality under Cost-Based Input-Pricing Parity
We now turn to the input quality o¤ered to the downstream a¢ liate under cost-based input-pricing parity requirements. Substituting the equality, w = c 0 (q 0 ; q 1 ), into total …rm pro…ts (see equation (6.1)), and di¤erentiating with respect to the a¢ liate input quality q 0 , we obtain the following result (where q 1 q 0 ): The "pure" social welfare value of an increase in the downstream a¢ liate's input quality is ( 0 0 (q 0 ))D
0
(1 ) 0 (q 0 )D 1 , inclusive of the quality increase's impact on the cost of supplying inputs to the downstream rival. This value is less than the value of the non-price-related e¤ects contained in equation (6.6), which equal
Thus, there is a private incentive to provide excessive input quality to the downstream a¢ liate when the downstream price e¤ects associated with raising the downstream a¢ liate's input quality produce relatively small demand shifts (and small associated pro…t e¤ects). Alternatively, if the margin on rival input sales, w c 1 (q 1 ; q 0 ), is su¢ ciently small in magnitude, then socially excessive input quality is provided to the downstream a¢ liate whenever a marginal increase in the downstream a¢ liate's input quality induces an increase in the downstream rival's retail price (i.e., when @p 1 =@q 0 + (@p 1 =@w) 0 (q 0 ) > 0).
Conclusion and Extensions
In a setting where an input monopolist sells to an a¢ liated downstream …rm and a downstream rival, we …nd that the welfare implications of parity rules are far from obvious. Forcing input prices to be the same, or forcing input quality to be the same, could harm social welfare relative to an unregulated outcome. Moreover, these policies may create perverse incentives. Speci…cally, imposing input-quality parity requirements does not eliminate the incentive to engage in input-pricing discrimination. Imposing input-pricing parity requirements may create incentives to engage in the socially wasteful downgrading of rival input quality when no such incentives existed in the absence of such requirements.
Clearly, the desirability of imposing input-quality parity requirements depends on the nature of input-pricing (e.g., access-pricing) policy. With no input-pricing regulation, a vertically integrated input monopolist makes welfare-maximizing input-quality choices (in a random-utility demand model). Either no rival sabotage occurs, or "sabotage"in the form of downgrading rival input quality is an e¢ cient outcome. However, with the imposition of cost-based input-pricing parity requirements, incentives may arise to ine¢ ciently downgrade (i.e., "sabotage") a downstream rival's input quality and possibly to excessively upgrade the input quality of a downstream a¢ liate. These incentives depend on whether downgrading rival input quality is a cost-reducing or cost-increasing action for the input monopolist.
There are a couple of omissions from our model that deserve future attention. First, the assumption of uniform pricing may not fully capture the richness of the pricing of intermediate inputs. A more complicated pricing scheme might involve the use of two-part tari¤s, for example. Bonanno and Vickers (1988) compare vertical integration and separation when an upstream …rm uses twopart tari¤s and downstream …rms o¤er di¤erentiated products and face Bertrand price competition. Reitzes and Woroch (2005) analyze horizontal oligopoly competition in a random-utility demand model where …rms set one-part or two-part tari¤s. An interesting extension of the current paper would be to examine the e¤ects of parity rules when inputs are sold using two-part tari¤s, and downstream …rms compete as di¤erentiated oligopolists.
Second, downstream …rms in our model are assumed to be passive with respect to choosing product quality, since the quality of the downstream product is only altered if the input monopolist changes the quality of the inputs that it provides. In reality, downstream …rms often can make investments that alter the quality of their own products. It could be the case that a downstream …rm is relatively more e¢ cient at enhancing product quality than the upstream …rm that supplies product inputs, implying that the downstream …rm may prefer lower input quality if it also pays a lower input price. E¢ ciency di¤erences across downstream …rms with respect to enhancing product quality could provide a sound economic basis for inducing an upstream …rm to o¤er inputs of di¤ering quality. Moreover, if investments in product quality can be made at both upstream and downstream stages of production, the imposed separation of pro…t-maximizing decisions achieved through mandatory vertical separation may produce welfare losses by creating a "double-marginalization"problem in the choice of quality.
